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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The literature on the recent liberalisation of electricity markets around the world 
discusses the successes and failures of the different approaches taken by many 
countries. All have common reasons and goals but the success of deregulation is a 
function of many factors, including the quality of all networks (transmission and 
distribution), the current economic environment and most importantly, country 
specific characteristics. In reality, the move from traditional state regulation to free 
market policies entails the swapping of one set of competitive issues for another. 
Governments entrust the market with the responsibility of ensuring a fair price for 
consumers. This paper examines some of these competitive concerns. 
 
Previous to restructuring, national electricity industries were monopolies controlled 
by the incumbent, such as the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) in the Republic of 
Ireland. With a monopoly in place, there was an assumption of inefficiency tied to the 
incumbent, which was hard to validate and arose due to the lack of competitors in the 
marketplace. Key decisions required government approval since government and at 
times regulators, controlled the central planning of business and investment decisions. 
However, one side effect of deregulation more than any other, is causing concern for 
industry participants. Shifting the responsibility to produce electricity from the State 
to private enterprise introduces profit motivation
1 and requires new methods to ensure 
the abuse of market power is managed correctly. While regulation remains a key part 
of the new market for electricity, additional monitoring is required for two reasons; 
first, rather than one state-owned monopoly, there are now many more market 
participants that must be observed to prevent abuse of market power. Second, an 
increase in the number of players in the market means that tacit collusion as well as 
unilateral action is a now a genuine possibility for gaming the market. 
 
The general goal of the liberalised electricity market is to provide a reliable electricity 
system at least cost to consumers by allowing competition to take place between rival 
                                                 
1 ESB 1927 Mandate required that any profits earned by the company should be re-invested.   4
                                                
generators to produce electricity, which leads to improved efficiency and greater 
innovation
2. The market for electricity production in Ireland, although liberalised six 
years ago, has not attracted many new entrants. Possible reasons suggested for this 
relate to the relatively small size of the market, lack of confidence in the regulatory 
regime and ESB dominance, which will be the focal point of the paper.  There are 
numerous strategies that could be put in place to tackle an incumbent’s dominant 
position, such as structural or regulatory solutions, but it is first necessary to assess 
the threat posed by a company since it is worth noting that EU Competition Law 
recognises that there is a very real distinction between dominance, abuse of a 
dominant position and even collective dominance. 
 
The main focus of this paper is on market power in the Irish electricity market. 
However, first we examine issues relating to market size and market structure. The 
section of the paper dealing with market structure, examines the effects of different 
types of gaming on market participants. In dealing with market power we use the 
traditional indices to measure the potential threat presented by the abuse of market 
power. In each case we look at the market for electricity in the Republic of Ireland 
only and the “All-Island” case. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 conducts a literature review of the 
measurement of market power in the electricity sector. Section 3 builds a model of 
electricity supply that enables us to conceptualise how market power is exercised in 
the sector under a variety of market circumstances. Section 4 examines some 
simulation results with respect to the effects of different bid-price strategies. Section 5 
considers model outcomes from a market dominance and market power perspective. 








2 Reference to “Market Liberalisation and Regulatory Reform” by Isolde Goggin at 
http://www.tca.ie/speeches/10-05-01.pdf.   5
 
SECTION 2: MEASUREMENT OF MARKET POWER IN THE 
ELECTRICTY SECTOR 
 
The traditional assessment of market power has focussed on the supplier’s ability to 
profitably alter prices away from competitive levels (Stoft, 2002). This interpretation 
is derived from the difference between the two polar cases of competition; perfect 
competition and monopoly. In perfect competition, many buyers imply that sellers are 
price takers. For this reason, the price of a homogeneous good is often very elastic 
and responsive to changes in price. Thus, in theory, the selling price is always close to 
or identical to its marginal cost. On the other hand, a monopolist is the sole seller. The 
lack of competition in the monopolist’s market ensures an inelastic reaction to 
changes in price and consequently, raising the price will not cause a huge reduction in 
sales, which would be seen in a perfectly competitive market.  
 
The extent to which price exceeds marginal cost is captured by the Lerner Index and 
is defined as; 
 
LI = Price – Marginal Cost 
      Price 
 
Since it is assumed that price is equal to marginal cost in a perfectly competitive 
market, the Lerner Index indicates the extent to which market performance deviates 
from the perfectly competitive benchmark. Firms that lack market power show ratios 
close to zero. As the ratio increases from zero to one, it is more likely that the firm 
possesses significant market power. Applying this technique to electricity markets and 
comparing a generator’s bid with its marginal cost, proves useful in identifying those 
producers that are frequently bidding in prices in excess of their marginal cost. Many 
empirical studies have looked at generator bid and cost data to uncover abuse of 
market power. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) were one of the first to apply this 
method to electricity markets. They examined the bid prices and costs of the two 
largest generating companies in the England and Wales electricity pool (National 
Power and Powergen) from May 1990 to April 1991 and concluded that in the   6
                                                
opening months of the pool’s operation both companies bid very close to their 
marginal costs. However, after the first nine months bids started to rise above their 
costs. 
 
Since electricity markets are more complicated than other markets, there are many 
criticisms of using the Lerner Index as a measure of market power in the sector. First 
and most importantly, the marginal cost used is generally estimated and derived from 
fuel prices and thermal efficiencies
3. Variable fuel costs do not take account of very 
real decisions associated with fuel purchasing such as commercial constraints on 
interconnectors. In addition, fuel switching is common in electricity companies that 
have multiple generators, using a variety of fuels and so quantifying the exact 
marginal cost of each supply unit is difficult as this may change over the course of the 
day and year. Secondly, most studies that employ the Lerner Index will use the short 
run marginal cost, (e.g. Von der Fehr and Harbord) but due to the large amounts of 
capital that are required in electricity markets, the long run marginal cost may give a 
better indication of the actual overall level of market power evident in the industry.  
 
In the electricity sector, above-cost pricing may not be a symptom of the exercise of 
market power since scarcity pricing is a characteristic of any market where the total 
available supply is capped in the short run. Scarcity pricing refers to those times of the 
day or year where demand is very close to the system’s total capacity and so the price 
of electricity on the spot market will be exceptionally high to reflect this scarcity and 
the closeness to full capacity. Excess demand is not possible in an electricity market 
as it will cause a “blackout”, so preventative measures must be taken before the 
equilibrium point is reached to maintain total available supply equal to demand. It 
must also be mentioned that many generators rely on these periods to recover the bulk 
of their fixed costs. More recent studies by Short and Swan (2002) and Evans and 
Green (2003) attempt to explain some of the variations in the Lerner Index with 
respect to structural and other factors. 
 
Another general measure of market power, that is considered helpful in defining the 
relevant market, is based on market concentration. Structural indices such as market 
 
3 See Appendix B for model description   7
                                                
share
4 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
5 assess the ex-ante potential for 
market power. Studies of market power in electricity markets usually include at least 
one measure of market concentration. Schmalensee and Golub (1984) conducted a 
study of 170 generation markets operational in the United States in 1978 and 
concluded that 35 percent to 60 percent of these markets had HHI values in excess of 
1800, which denotes highly concentrated markets, where abuse of market power is 
considered more likely. A similar and more up-to-date analysis, based on 1994 data, 
was conducted by Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997) and concluded that roughly 90 
percent of the markets examined had HHI values in excess of 2500.  
 
Although the HHI and market share indices are internationally recognisable standards, 
as static measures they do not represent the real-time aspect of electricity markets 
very well. Furthermore, they only examine the supply side of the market. For 
instance, there may exist some market with a HHI value below 1000. This figure 
would typically characterise an unconcentrated market where the threat of abuse of 
market power is low. However, even the smallest generator can possess some level of 
power to affect prices. This can be the result of harsh weather, breakdowns, 
transmission failures etc. When suppliers are essential for the certain and adequate 
provision of electricity, they possess significant market power regardless of their 
company size relative to the market. This occurs most often when the system is close 
to full capacity.  
 
William and Rosen (1999) attempted to relax the static feature of the HHI, by using 
daily HHI values. Though they deduced that a daily HHI based on power delivered, 
had no ability to predict actual market power as measured by the price-cost margin 
index.  
 
Finding suitable standards is not just a problem for market participants. Both the 
European Commission and the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
employ tests based on behavioural and structural indices to assist in defining the 
relevant market. Currently the EU DG for Competition Commission relies on the 
 
4 The market share concentration ratio is the percentage of market share attributed to the largest firms. 
For example, the 4 firm concentration ratio refers to the total share of the largest 4 firms in the market. 
5 The HHI is the sum of the squares of all market shares in the industry.  See Section 3 for a more 
detailed description.   8
                                                
“small but significant non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) test. This test asks the 
question, if all generators in a particular location combined into a single company, 
could a price rise of 5% in that region be sustained?  
 
In the U.S., the “hub-and-spoke method”, which identified affected customers as 
those that are directly interconnected with the merging parties, was dropped in favour 
of a new method for determining market - the Supply Margin Assessment criteria. 
The hub-and-spoke analysis acknowledged potential suppliers as: (1) those suppliers 
that are directly interconnected with the customer (the "first-tier" suppliers); and (2) 
those suppliers that are directly interconnected with the merging parties and that the 
customer thus can reach indirectly through the merging parties' open access 
transmission tariff (the "second-tier" suppliers). This technique did not take account 
of the many other factors that affect the relative size of a market and resulted in 
markets that could be broader or narrower than those defined by the first and second 
tier analysis. 
 
The Supply Margin Assessment (SMA) is also known as the Pivotal Supplier 
Indicator/Index (PSI) and is the first index to consider both demand and supply 
limitations. It examines whether a certain generator is necessary (or “pivotal”) in 
serving demand. The basis for the SMA compares the total capacity of a generator 
with the surplus supply
6. Bushnell et al. (1999) characterise the PSI as a binary 
indicator for a certain supplier for a certain point in time. It is set equal to one if the 
supplier is deemed pivotal and zero otherwise. Aggregating over a period of time, say 
one year, provides a figure indicating the amount of time during the year that the 
supplier was pivotal and had the power to affect price. For example, if a supplier 
knows demand will be high and that their electricity will more than likely be required, 
they can effectively name their price. Vassilopoulos (2003) expresses criticism of this 
approach since it fails to take account of net buying or selling positions through 
contracting and also states that the measure is highly restrictive since only peak hours 
are examined. While Blumsack et al (2002) suggest supporting the SMA with a HHI 
applied specifically to groups of suppliers, who together, are pivotal. 
 
 
6 The difference between total supply and demand   9
                                                
The Residual Supply Index (RSI)
7 is a variation of the PSI, developed by the 
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) as a continuous metric that could 
better represent the potential for an abuse of market power by a generator. The RSI 
for a company X measures the percent of supply capacity remaining after subtracting 
company X’s capacity of supply (less contract obligations). An individual company’s 
RSI of above 100 percent implies that the company is not pivotal and vice versa. 
Therefore a low RSI is of more concern to the market than a high RSI. Sheffrin et al. 
(2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2004) established the existence of a relationship between 
hourly RSI and hourly price-cost markup in the California market. Empirically, the 
correlation between the two indicates that on average, an RSI of approximately 120 
percent will result in a market price outcome close to the competitive benchmark. 
While there is no doubt that the PSI captures many of the indications of market 
power, the RSI has the added advantage of flexibility in setting thresholds, compared 
to the PSI, which is set at 100 percent. 
 
This paper attempts to analyse the issue of market power in the Irish electricity sector, 
using both a static and dynamic measure, namely, the traditional HHI index and the 
CAISO’s RSI measure. The HHI will be employed to evaluate traditional market 
concentration and the CAISO’s RSI will be used to assess the potential for market 














7 RSIx = (Total Capacity – Company X’s Relevant Capacity)/Total Demand. See Section 3 for a more 
detailed description.   10
SECTION 3: MODELLING ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
 
3.1 Key technical features of electricity production 
 
When analysing the electricity industry, it is important to first consider the 
characteristics of electricity. As the end product is always the same, electricity is a 
homogenous good and it has an inelastic demand since it is a necessary good for 
households and businesses. This gives electricity firms considerable market power 
and is one of the reasons for regulation of the industry. The success of any economy is 
very reliant on the adequate and certain provision of electricity. It is a capital-
intensive industry and is characterised by significant initial investment costs and high 
costs of capital because of the high degree of technology, expertise and infrastructure 
required. However, the principal distinguishing characteristic of electricity and many 
other products is that it cannot be stored. Real-time dispatch must occur to prevent 
“blackouts”. This means that at every second of every day the system operator is 
working to ensure that only the exact amount of electricity required is produced by 
generators. If excess electricity were produced it would increase thermal losses and 
could prove dangerous for the system. In electricity markets it is not possible for 
excess supply or excess demand to guarantee that an equilibrium point is reached for 
every minute of the day. In contrast to most forms of commodity trading, stocks of 
inventories cannot be kept on hand to balance the market. These standard market-
clearing forces require a time dimension that is not feasible, as the market must be 
cleared in real-time. Thus, to ensure the least expensive outcome, it is necessary to 
employ the most efficient use of generation resources for that particular time of day.  
 
Ireland currently uses the following fuels/technologies for electricity generation; Coal, 
Oil – Heavy Fuel Oil & Diesel Oil, Gas – CCGT & OCGT, Peat, Hydro, Wind and 
other renewables such as CHP, Biomass. Gas CCGT’s are the most common new 
stations on the market. There are many reasons for this including; the fast-pace with 
which CCGT’s can be built. It takes two-to-three years to commission a Gas-CCGT, 
whereas to build a coal-fired station usually takes four-to-five years. In addition, there 
are relatively low operation and maintenance costs associated with new CCGT’s. Gas 
also has its advantages; it is a clean fuel with a low carbon content in comparison the 
other fossil fuels. With both Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT’s) and Open   11
                                                
Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT’s), the engine produces its own pressurized gas by 
burning natural gas. The heat that comes from burning the fuel expands air, and the 
high-speed rush of this hot air spins the turbine.  
 
Peat is a fuel native to Ireland and consists mainly of plant remains that have formed 
over many hundreds of years. Before indigenous natural gas came on stream in 
Ireland in 1979, peat was the most important indigenous energy resource in Ireland. 
Peat has been used for electricity generation since the 1950s
8. However, is not widely 
used in electricity production since peat has a high carbon content, higher than coal, 
and the technology is not as cost-efficient. As a result the generator obtains less 
electricity per tonne of peat, than it would with a more efficient technology or fuel.  
 
There can be many technologies capable of generating with each type of fuel and each 
of these technologies in turn possess different characteristics, relating to maximum 
capacity, efficiency, availability, costs, required ramp-up time
9 and Minimum Stable 
Generation (MSG). For example, a Gas-CCGT station would be the cheapest station 
to run at maximum capacity since gas is one of the cheapest fuels, the technology has 
one of the highest levels of efficiency and availability and labour costs are reasonable. 
However, if only a fifth of a station’s capacity were needed and only for a short 
period of time, sometimes due to MSG, it is not efficient to turn the station on. Each 
type of technology has a minimum amount that it can be switched on to produce, 
anything less than this amount would be uneconomical. Usually in this situation, an 
oil-fired plant would be more suitable due to its quicker ramp-up time, although the 
cost per MWhr would be greater. So, in any electricity system a range of different 
types of generation is  usually required. For simplicity these are characterised as; 
“Baseload”, “Mid-merit load” and “Peak load”.  
 
Baseload refers to the cheapest forms of generation. It may be cheap due to the price 
of the underlying fuel, like renewables and coal-fired generation, or, it may be the 
newest, most efficient technology on the market, such as Gas-CCGT. These stations 
tend to run most of the day and therefore have the lowest cost per MWhr when total 
costs are spread out over the total electricity produced. Mid-merit load stations would 
 
8 For further information on peat see www.bnm.ie  
9 Time needed for electricity to be produced, that is, the time it takes to reach full capacity.   12
run for a considerable part of the day, usually based around the working hours, nine to 
five. These stations offer the next cheapest MWhr of electricity overall. The most 
expensive electricity, supplied by peak load generating stations, would only be used at 
the times during the day and year when demand is highest. These generators could be 
using a fuel such as oil and/or the technology may exhibit high operation and 
maintenance costs (O&M Costs), but usually they tend to be the generators with the 
shortest ramp-up time. Since these stations are aware that they will only be required 
for a small number of hours in the year and still must recoup all of their costs, the 
price that they charge for producing electricity can be extremely high. All stations rely 
on these peak-hours to recover their fixed costs. 
 
3.2 A model of electricity supply 
 
3.2.1 The Data 
 
Modelling the electricity system of any country is difficult because in addition to the 
technical constraints that are embedded in the sector there are also country-specific 
regulatory and commercial constraints that must be taken into account. Given the 
range of complexities inherent in the sector, the aim was to construct a model that 
replicated the key features of the Irish electricity system for the 2003 supply year. 
Thus certain technical features, such as engineering constraints relating to ramp-up 
times (and costs) were excluded.  
 
Populating the model with data required information from many sources, both 
national and international. Basic information on generators operational in the country 
was taken from Eirgrid’s Generation Adequacy Report 2004-2010 and ESB’s Annual 
Report 1992: type of fuel used, capacity, efficiency, availability. For example, 
Moneypoint is a coal-fired station with a total export capacity
10 of 855MW, at 34% 
efficiency and 90% availability (the other 10% is committed to scheduled 
maintenance). The marginal cost of production for each fuel was based on an average 
of fuel prices for the first three quarters of 2003 together with the efficiency of each 
station’s technology. Operational costs were estimated using various sources 
including the CER’s Best New Entrant 2004 paper. 
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Figure 3.1:  All-Island Capacity Optimisation Chart 
 
Input data regarding levels of demand for the Republic and Northern Ireland were 
taken from the Eirgrid and SONI
11 websites respectively in the form of half-hourly 
data for 2003. For the purpose of modelling interconnectors to the U.K., it was 
necessary to obtain the wholesale sell prices for electricity for 2003
12.  
 
Particular attention was paid to specific issues, such as the annual maintenance of all 
generators. In order to realistically optimise these scheduled outages it was necessary 
to create a timetable, indicating when generators were on or off, that reflected the 
percentage planned availability for each station. This was achieved using “educated 
guesses” such as, assuming that the larger baseload stations would be needed in 
winter and so would be scheduled for maintenance outages during the summer and 
hydro stations would be operational for only the peak times during the day, since they 
are physically constrained to a very low availability. This timetable was also 
constructed to roughly follow the annual load profile, which was assumed to remain 
unchanged from year to year.  
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the annual coverage in capacity in the All-Island electricity 
market, taking into consideration the scheduled outages of generators. The least 
  13
                                                 
11 System Operator of Northern Ireland. 
12 These were located on the website – www.bmreports.com in association with NETA.   14
                                                
amount of capacity is required in summer and so many of the larger stations are 
scheduled for maintenance from May to September. 
 
The intermittency of wind means that it is hard to predict the amount of energy that 
wind will produce on any given day. For this reason, a random number generator with 
a normal distribution was chosen to model for the variability in wind. Wind was 
assumed to be available on average thirty-seven percent of the time, spread randomly 
over the year. Wind was also assumed to be either on or off for the entire day. 
 
There is currently one interconnector on the island, which joins Northern Ireland to 
Scotland. The interconnector is only modelled when the All-Island scenario is being 
considered. The movement of electricity through the interconnector is limited to 
500MW but it is assumed that there are no constraints pertaining to the direction of 
transfer.  One other assumption that is only in force in the All-Island scenario, relates 
to NIE’s Power Procurement Business. It is mentioned as part of the background
13, 
that the method of supply of electricity in the North differs from the South. 
Generators enter into short-, medium- and long-term contracts to supply electricity. 
This approach is one way of ensuring production at low/minimum cost, but it is not 
operational in the Republic of Ireland and so, in order to model the systems 
identically, it was assumed that Power Purchase Agreements do not exist and all 
market participants simply bid into an energy pool, where bids are ranked in order of 
preference, cheapest first – dearest last.  
 
The model is capable of replicating the individual markets for electricity in the 
Republic and Northern Ireland, together with an All-Island system. It also has the 
capability to model the impact of different sized electricity interconnectors to Great 
Britain. Therefore, the model is capable of addressing various issues presently 
concerning the electricity market, such as the debate regarding the All-Island market, 
the effects of carbon taxation/emissions and other price shocks, and the consequence 
of different bidding strategies. Future years and fuel compositions can also be 
considered using a growth factor
14 for demand under the assumption that the load 
 
13 See Appendix A for Background of electricity markets in Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
14 Taken from the ESRI MTR and the forecast growth in electricity demand.   15
profile remains unchanged.  This paper will use the model to examine the effects of 
different bidding strategies and market power. 
 
3.2.2 The Modelling Process 
 
Electricity demand is highly cyclical in nature. From winters to summers and even 
from nights to days, the amount of electricity needed by the country fluctuates on a 
moment-by-moment basis. Using historic demand data and weather information, it is 
possible to have a rough estimate of the quantity required and consequently electricity 
is sold hours in advance by generators. Each station bids into the market a 
price/volume combination, that is, the amount it can supply in the next half-hour 
period and the price per Megawatt-hour (MWhr) of that electricity. It is hard to 
estimate the bid-price, but one can assume that it should cover the fuel cost. In the 
medium-term, stations must also cover their operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, 
such as labour, and in the long-term they must be capable of repaying their capital 
debts.  
 
The model first assumes that all plants bid in their fuel price per MWhr. In order to 
choose which stations will generate, the model ranks the generators. The cheapest bid 
is ranked first and the others follow in ascending order, this is known as a Simple 
Stack Model. Table 3.2 illustrates the model-generated marginal costs for different 
generating stations and capacities.  
 
Generating Station Capacity  Bid Price per MWhr 
(Marginal Cost) 
Station A  5 MW  €10.50 
Station B  50MW  €12.00 
Station C  200MW  €12.10 
Station D  100MW  €12.75 
Station E  40MW  €15.00 
Station F  160MW  €16.80 
Station G  180MW  €17.30 
Station H  2MW  €21.90 
Table 3.2: Example of electricity generator bids in a Simple Stack Model   16
                                                
 
The next step is to offer contracts to those generators that fall within the level of 
demand required in that half-hour segment. If for example, 500MW were needed, 
Stations A to F (in italics) would be contracted to generate. It is important to note that 
Station F would be known as the “marginal station” and would not generate to its full 
capacity, since the cumulative total to Station F is 555MW and only 105MW of its 
potential capacity would be required to reach the 500MW target. The price that each 
generator receives is called the “system marginal price” and is determined by the bid 
price (marginal cost) of the marginal station. In the example above, Stations A to F 
would receive €16.80 per MWhr produced and each would make a straightforward 
surplus
15 with the exception of Station F, which would just break even. The system 
marginal price will vary over time depending on the cost of the most expensive station 
commissioned to generate. Consequently, the price of electricity is higher at peak 
times of the day and year.  
 
Ranking the generators in this fashion and simulating the electricity system, basing 
the merit-order only on short-run marginal costs (fuel costs) represents the most 
efficient economic dispatch. The portfolio of generators at the disposal of the 
transmission system operator and the size of the margin between demand and total 
available capacity will have a significant effect on the outcomes. If demand is high, 
stations at the bottom of the stack model will be needed, which means that the 
revenue per MWhr that each station receives will also be substantial. 
 
We now turn to the case of medium-run cost. In order to find a feasible medium-run 
cost, with which to compare the short-run cost of fuel cost, it was necessary to 
simulate the model to find those supply bids for each generator that allowed them to 
at least break even, whilst taking into consideration the bids of other generators. 
Hence the Medium-Run Marginal Cost (MRMC) equals the fuel cost plus an 
allowance for ‘operational and maintenance’ (O&M) costs. The required adjustment 
for O&M costs depends on the simulated break-even bid price. 
 
 
15 Defined as revenue minus cost. This break-even
16 bid refers to the aggregate of all generating stations that may 
operate on a particular site. For example, in the case of the ESB’s Moneypoint
17 
generator the break-even bid price refers to the total of three separate generating 
stations that operate on the site. In relation to profitability and breaking even, this 
would mean that the surplus on the three units of Moneypoint would have to be 
greater than or equal to zero. Finally, the model allows us to identify the price-setting 
generators
18 and to compile indices of market power.  
 
The operating profit that generating station i (STPi) makes in a year is equal to its 
revenue minus its variable costs
19, defined as; 
 








i,j x ICi,j))  -  Ci
 
where  i   = 1,…,58 (number of stations). 
j   =  1,…,17520 (number of 30 minute periods in a 365-day year) 
SP   = “System” price (price bid by the marginal generator) 
IC   = Individual Capacity that each generator produces in each period 
p   = Price bid by each station 
C  = O&M costs of each station 
 
Therefore, operating profit refers to the residual after all variable costs have been 
deducted. This figure may cover part, or, all of the capital repayments of the various 
technologies. The latter requirement has a major impact on any future investment 
decision in generating capacity regarding generation but in our case capital cost is 
sunk.  
 
3.2.3 Modelling Limitations 
 
As noted already, the model does not perfectly capture all of the operational features 
of the electricity market. For instance, normally when demand is high, supply is 
                                                 
16 Defined as Total Revenue minus (Fuel Cost plus O&M Cost) > 0. 
17 Only coal fired power station in the Republic. Consists of three separate units. 
18 The marginal station; sets the price paid to all generators that make the cut to generate 
  17
19 Fuel costs and O&M costs.   18
                                                
almost at its maximum and so the price per MWhr is very expensive and one often 
observes what are known as “price spikes”. This outcome arises because it is usually 
in these periods of high demand/short supply that generators recover their capital 
costs. In the model these price spikes are less pronounced they have been smoothed 
using a cap on the bid price. The bid price has been assumed to never go above 
€2,000 plus fuel cost/MWhr
20. There are two main reasons for this model restriction. 
First, since some generators may not generate any electricity in the year, the model 
would not have been solvable had a suitable cap not been chosen. Secondly, €2,000 
per MWhr is considered a reasonable approximation to the Value of Lost Load 
(VOLL)
21 for the system
22.  
 
Economies of scale are ubiquitous in capital-intensive industries like electricity 
markets. However, research into the area of scale economies in electricity generation 
is not conclusive. It is not clear how important they are, or, at what scale they are 
exhausted (Joskow et al, 1985). Evidently, in the case of the Irish industry scale 
economies were not considered significant enough to support the proposition that the 
generation of electricity should be considered a natural monopoly (Massey, 2003). It 
is accepted, however, that economies of scale will exist at some level of output. 
Christensen and Greene (1976) believed that such economies of scale are fully 
exploited by generation companies with over 4,000 MW of capacity but due to 
information problems, could not give a comparable result for integrated utilities. It is 
worth noting that the ESB controls approximately 3,900 MW. Joskow et al (1985) 
discuss many studies that highlight the scale augmenting nature of technical change as 
one of the only clear-cut contributors to economies of scale. Typically, models that 
incorporate economies of scale do so as a maintained hypothesis of the model, which 
means that the relationship cannot be determined endogenously. There is little or no 
research on economies of scale in the generation sector for the Irish electricity system. 
On balance, therefore, we felt that it would not be unrealistic to attempt to model 
economies of scale in the case of the Irish electricity market. 
 
20 CPB Study No. 60, “Capacity to spare? A cost-benefit approach to optimal spare capacity in 
electricity production” refers to a present value of 0.3million euro for the costs of 100MW outage of 
one hour. 
21 An estimate of customer valuation. 
22 See CPB document: “Capacity to spare? A cost benefit approach to optimal spare capacity in 
electricity production”.   19
SECTION 4: EFFECTS OF BID-PRICE STRATEGIES AND THE 




There are some major modelling differences between the Republic of Ireland and All-
Island scenario that are worth clarifying. The All-Island perspective represents the 
inclusion of Northern Ireland and the interconnector to Great Britain. Northern Ireland 
consists of independent generators; Ballylumford and Kilroot, which also incorporate 
some independent OCGT’s. While Coolkeragh is part of the ESB portfolio, it is still 
connected to and sells its electricity through the Northern Ireland grid. The demand 
profile in the North is not the same as in the South, as well as the spread of generators 
across the country and size of generation. Ballylumford is the largest generator in the 
North, contributing a total capacity of 774MW, split into five separate stations. Such a 
large contribution by any one generator is expected to cause at least some minor 
changes to the results.  
 
Two features of the analysis should be noted. First, the iterative process associated 
with the MRMC bidding strategy would be different in an All-Island market since 
there are more stations to consider and the solution depends on the bids of other 
generators. Secondly, the markets in question are the Republic of Ireland market in 
isolation, versus an All-Island electricity market. Comparisons are done on this basis, 
as no modelling of the individual market for Northern Ireland was conducted.  
 
Finally, as explained in the previous section, two types of bidding strategies are 
analysed in the paper. First, from an economic cost and social cost perspective, the 
fuel only bid price, or, the SRMC bid, ensures the most efficient dispatch of the 
available system, and, the second bid-price strategy, namely, the fuel plus allowance 
for O&M, or, the MRMC bid. It is worth noting that if economies of scale were 
present, they could have an effect on a generator’s bid price, since a multi-generator 
company with significant contractual power may be able to obtain better terms of 
agreement than an Independent Power Producer (IPP).  
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Currently the Republic of Ireland operates a bilateral market. This means that the 
buyer and seller contract to supply a certain amount of electricity at some stage in the 
future or over a period of time. There is also a market for imbalances. The top-up and 
spill regime allows system shortfalls and surpluses to be managed. Usually, 
generators employ contracts to handle their price risk in the electricity market. Fuel 
purchasing using forward contracts helps to ensure individual security of supply and 
can generally offer more favourable pricing terms than relying on a spot market alone. 
Moving forward, the CER wishes to alter these trading arrangements such that 
electricity would be bought and sold in a “gross pool”. This would be a centralised 
trading market. All physical power could be traded for the market as a whole, using 
uniform prices and a spot market. Bid prices submitted by generators would therefore 
include as much or as little of the true cost per MWhr as they wish. They may or may 
not include the full per unit O&M cost. Generators could still contract outside of the 
market. In addition to physical contracts, generators also use financial contracts to 
hedge the price of fuel. Interpreting these contracts as a form of guarantee on a 
generators cost stream, implies that if the same could be done for the revenue stream, 
it could reduce the price of risk and thus electricity, and be very attractive for 
generators.  
 
Competition by generators ensures the cheapest price for electricity since each firm 
competes to supply each MWhr at its lowest possible price. The fuel cost in the model 
represents this price. Since all stations receive the price offered by the marginal 
station, there is still the possibility that a generator may cover its O&M costs, even if 
it did not specifically allow for them in the bid price. With the lowest possible price, 
the cost of fuel, the risk of not covering O&M costs depends on the type of 
generation, but there is a high risk of not meeting capital repayment obligations for all 
forms of generation. For this reason, the SRMC bid-scenario is only likely to transpire 
i f  s o m e  f o r m  o f  s u r e t y  w e r e  o f f e r e d  o n  a generator’s revenue stream, such as a 
capacity payment.  
 
If large losses were to be observed, investment in new generation would be stifled. 
Therefore this is not an option. Thus, there are only two feasible solutions, normal 
profits or supernormal profits. Normal profits would refer to the case where all costs 
(fuel, O&M, annual capital repayments) are covered in the long run and the generator makes a small return for entrepreneurship. In this case, the market would only attract 
additional generation when it was profitable. Supernormal profits refers to all costs 
covered in the long run, however, some/all generators make large profits, such that the 
market attracts significant new investment. For price to return to a competitive level, a 
considerable amount of plant would have to be built, such that, the cost of this 
expansion would put the consumer at a further disadvantage, regardless of whether it 
was warranted on system security grounds. 
 
4.2 The difference between the SRMC and MRMC bidding strategies 
 








0 1500 3000 4500 6000























Figure 4.1:  All-Island Station Marginal Cost Function 
 
Figure 3 shows the deviation between the two different bidding strategies and 
demonstrates the basic principal of any bidding structure, that as demand for 
electricity increases, the price will also increase. The Station Marginal Cost Function 
shows how many megawatts can be purchased for up to a certain price. The diagram 
illustrates that under both bidding strategies, a small amount of power can be 
purchased at zero marginal cost. This output represents the renewable energy 
available, such as wind and hydro. Another 1,000 MW’s approximately can be bought 
for just less than €20 per MW. As the market gets closer to full capacity, the deviation 
between the two bidding strategies becomes more apparent. This arises because the 
peaking stations are bidding a much higher price per MWhr that to enable them to 
recoup their true variable costs.  
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If the generator had a choice between the two bidding mechanisms, short-run costs or 
medium-run costs, they would choose the strategy that offered the lowest risk and/or 
the highest return and/or the greatest freedom to act independently. Any one of those 
circumstances would be more closely associated with the MRMC bid price since it 
leaves the final decision in the hands of the generator. In addition, companies with 
multiple generators have a greater opportunity to take advantage of cross-
subsidisation between stations and between times in the day. Stations will profit 
maximise regardless of the bidding structure, however, they would prefer to profit 
maximise using the MRMC bid price as it leaves a greater range of possible values 
that can be employed for extracting returns from the market. Nonetheless, from the 
regulators perspective, the first step should to ensure that the welfare of the consumer 
is maximised by the choice of strategy. 
 
4.3 Effects of the SRMC bidding strategy 
 
It has already been said that the energy industry is highly capital-intensive and can 
also have high maintenance costs. Consider according to their SRMC. 
 
  RoI All-Island 
Time Weighted Ave. Price
23 € 34.43  € 32.50 
Op. Profit
24 / Loss
25 Per MW 
Stations 
33% / 67%  23% / 77% 
Per MW Average  - €133.32  - € 240.01 
ESB Per MW Average  - €171.95  - € 305.75 
Non-ESB Per MW Average   €15.71   € 13.57 
Table 4.2: Table of Results for each market under the SRMC bidding structure 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates that increased choice and intensified competition in an All-Island 
energy market, results in a reduction in the time weighted average price of producing 
                                                 
23 Time weighted average price of one MWhr of electricity. 
24 Operational Loss  = Where Total Revenue minus Total Cost (fuel and O&M) for a station is divided 
by the number of hours that the station generates, and the result is negative. Cannot cover its day-to-
day costs of fuel and O&M and cannot make any contribution towards capital repayments. 
 
25 Operational Profit = Where Total Revenue minus Total Cost (fuel and O&M) for a station is divided 
by the number of hours that the station generates, and the result is positive. Can cover its day-to-day 
costs of fuel and O&M and can make some contribution towards capital repayments.   23
                                                
a MWhr of electricity. More efficient stations are being chosen to supply electricity, 
which reduces the cost of producing that power. This result is not dependent on which 
bidding structure under review and the same result, that is, a reduction in cost from 
increasing market size, is also observed for the MRMC bid-price strategy. 
Furthermore, from a social perspective, emissions are reduced.  
 
The reduction in the cost of electricity production to the economy means that 
consumers are better off, however, this implies that generators are earning less. The 
average price of producing one MWhr of electricity has been reduced from €34.43 to 
€32.50 and therefore more stations are finding it harder to make ends meet. 
Consequently, the number of stations making an operational loss per MW rises from 
67% to 77% in the Republic of Ireland and All-Island systems respectively, as the 
severity of these average losses also increases from  €133.32 per MW to €240.01 per 
MW. 
 
Most individual generators (both public and private) incur losses, with deficits rising 
to equal their complete
26 O&M cost for the year for stations that produce little or no 
electricity
27. Most baseload plants make positive returns, with Moneypoint making the 
most operating profits. Baseload plant has the lowest per MWhr fuel cost of all fossil 
fuelled generation, since it generates a constant flow of electricity. These stations 
recoup enough on each unit to cover at least their day-to-day costs. Mid-merit stations 
are normally less efficient than baseload, and therefore, have higher marginal costs 
and lower operational profit. Some of these stations would see their operating profits 
go from positive to negative in the face of an All-Island market. Peaking stations that 
might only generate for a small number of hours in the year incur the biggest losses 
since their price is capped at €2,000 plus their fuel cost. Renewables
28 incur zero fuel 
cost and thus make an operational profit, but their high fixed costs have not yet been 
taken into account. Under current conditions, generators would be happier to operate 
with the SRMC bid price in the Republic of Ireland market since their operating 
profits are, on average, €106 per MW higher.  
 
 
26 Total Revenue minus Total Cost (fuel and O&M). 
27 Stations such as Lanesboro, Shannonbridge & Bellacorrick. 
28In relation to small-scale independent renewables such as Wind, CHP, Biomass, Hydro – these 
independents have been grouped together for ease of modelling.   24
                                                
The ESB currently owns 73% of all generation in the Republic of Ireland and 
although it might be expected that the ESB’s results for the above table would be 
more favourable, this is not the case. Due to an older portfolio of plant, the ESB had 
some stations operational in 2003 that might have cost a lot more per MW than the 
revenue they generated. These stations are old, oil-fired peaking stations that have 
become uncompetitive and therefore ran for very few hours in the year, but still had to 
cover O&M costs. Furthermore, even without including these stations, the ESB’s 
figures were on average, 27% lower than the above economy-wide average. Also, the 
average change to ESB’s earnings per MW was 3% lower, at 69% loss per MW, when 
moving from a Republic of Ireland market to an All-Island market.  
 
In 2003, there are also several independent power producers (IPP’s) operational in the 
Republic - Huntstown, Dublin Bay and Edenderry. Some have larger parent 
companies
29 and others are single-plant generators. Edenderry is the only independent 
station to make an operating loss
30 in the Republic of Ireland market. It is, however, 
the recipient of a Public Service Obligation (PSO) subsidy
31. A PSO is similar to a 
grant for types of energy, such as renewables and peat, which would not be 
economically viable without some form of financial support. Each consumer pays an 
extra percentage on their bill to cover these extra costs (until such a time that they are 
no longer required). Most independent generators in the Republic of Ireland market 
operate at baseload, such as Viridian (Huntstown) and Dublin Bay. The modelling 
suggests that these stations make a small surplus that can contribute to capital costs. 
 
The fact that these baseload IPP’s can make only a small surplus highlights the level 
of uncertainty faced by investors in the Irish market. Investors understand that if all 
players bid in the smallest feasible amount
32, by force or freewill, only the cheapest 
baseload stations would recoup enough to cover day-to-day costs and make a small 
contribution to capital debts. This outlook is confirmed by the fact that baseload has 
 
29 Energia is the parent company of Viridian, Edenderry is owned by Finnish energy supplier Fortum 
30 Cannot cover its day-to-day costs of fuel and O&M and cannot make any contribution towards 
capital repayments. 
31 A detailed explanation of the purpose and workings of a PSO can be found at 
http://www.esbie.ie/energy_in_business/your_bill.html#PSOLevy.  
32 Assumed to be the fuel cost. naturally attracted new competition. The CER has sought tenders for new generators 
in the baseload and peaking plant
33 divisions of the market. 
 
4.4 Effects of the MRMC bidding strategy 
 
In modelling the electricity system, the theory of producer surplus becomes much 
more apparent. It is the plants that can offer electricity cheapest that make the most 
money before capital remuneration. Although, it must be noted that these stations 






























Figure 4.3: Theoretical Diagram of Producer Surplus
34
 
Figure 4.3 shows that in each half-hour segment, the price setting station (system 
marginal cost line) determines who generates and how much surplus each station will 
make. Generating stations that can offer electricity at the cheapest prices, usually 
baseload plant, will make the most money. This corresponds to the top left of the 
Revenue 1 line, near the Y-axis. As the line descends towards the point of 
equilibrium, more mid-merit stations are in use and revenues are declining with 
respect to costs. Assuming that the marginal station bids in its cost for that period, it is 
the only station to just break even.  
                                                 
33 Peaking plants would only be required for the most energy intensive hours in the day, usually around 
lunchtime. They would also use a fuel source and generator that allowed them to turn the station on and 
off rapidly, e.g. Diesel generators. 
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34 Producer surplus is the excess of revenue over cost.  
The concept of producer surplus makes it easy to see that there is a multiplier effect 
on the revenues to generators in energy markets. Consider again the marginal station 
that bids in its MRMC. It is bidding in enough such that it will recover its own 
medium-term per unit cost and will break even. This is acceptable, but the effect of 
this becomes inflated revenues for other generators, which would push the Revenue 1 
line out to Revenue 2, where more can be earned for each MW. So, not only is the 
baseload station receiving the difference between the per unit fuel costs of the two 
generators (difference in SRMC bids), but it is also receiving the difference in the per 
unit O&M costs, which could be significant given that a baseload station would have 
one of the lowest per unit O&M costs. The number of units sold then multiplies this 
figure.  
 
Mathematically, this could be considered as follows; 
 
Recall that Operational Profit/Loss was defined as:  








i,j x ICi,j))  -  Ci
where  i   = 1,…,58 (number of stations). 
j   =  1,…,17520 (number of 30 minute periods in a 365-day year) 
SP   = System price (price offered by marginal station) 
IC   = Individual Capacity that each station produces in each period 
p   = Price offered by each station 
 
Assume station X is a baseload generator, then the following is generally true; 
Baseload Bid Price < Mid-Merit Bid Price < Peaking Station Bid Price. 
 
Assuming that station X’s bid price is equal to it medium-run marginal cost (MRMC),   
Then it is also true that both “SP” and “p” are made up of two elements; a fuel cost 
and an O&M cost.  
 
Regardless of whether the price setting station is a Mid-merit or Peaking plant, on 
average both the fuel cost and O&M cost of the baseload generator will be equivalent 
or less than the costs of the marginal station. For example, comparing a baseload 
CCGT plant with a peaking plant oil generator and taking generator efficiencies into 
  26account, the per MWhr cost of oil is greater than that of gas
35. A CCGT plant runs 
almost continuously compared to the peaking station that is only required for a small 
number of hours in the year, and so, the per unit O&M cost of a CCGT generator is 
much lower than that of the peaking plant. 
 
Let  SP = SP
f + SP
o   and  p = p
f + p
o,  where f = fuel and o = O&M 
 
The Operational Profit/Loss figure under the SRMC bidding strategy is given by the 
differences in the fuel costs only; 
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Whereas, the Operational Profit/Loss figure under the MRMC bidding strategy is 
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Modelling the system using MRMC bids confirms this effect since total revenue on 
electricity production increases five fold in the Republic of Ireland model simulation 
and the Time Weighted Average Price in the Republic of Ireland increases from 
€34.43 to €162.12 under the SRMC/MRMC strategies respectively. Grossly inflated 
surpluses at a huge cost to the economy are observed for most generators. These 




                                                 
35 The marginal cost of fuel per MWhr is equal to the fuel price per MW divided by the efficiency of 
the generator.   RoI All-Island 
Op. Profit
36/ Loss
37 Per MW 
Stations 
86% / 14%  86% / 14% 
Per MW Average  € 135.17  € 192.10 
ESB Per MW Average  € 143.26  € 222.41 
Non-ESB Per MW Average  € 103.97  € 75.19 
Table 4.4: Table of Results for each market under the MRMC bidding structure 
 
Table 4.4 shows the comparative figures for the MRMC scenario with respect to 
average earnings. There has been a large reduction in the number of stations with 
operational losses. The remaining 14% are the old peaking stations that were referred 
to earlier as operating for very few hours in the year and restricted by the bid price 
threshold. Comparing average earnings and the relative changes in those earnings 
becomes more difficult as some stations make gains from increasing the market size, 
such as peaking stations that benefit from the new load profile. However, the fact that 
increasing the market size does not increase the number of stations earning an 
operational loss per MW, indicates that the operating profits must be sizeable, since 
they would certainly be diminished by the increased competition offered by the All-
Island market. 
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Figure 4.5: All-Island Baseload coverage of Capital Repayments 
                                                 
36 Operating Profit. See footnote no. 28. 

















































Figure 4.6:  All-Island Mid-Merit/Peak load coverage of Capital Repayments 
 
Each point in figures 4.5 and 4.6 represents a station. So, a station with an installed 
capacity of 300MW’s would have corresponding markers in a vertical line to the 
300MW spot on the X-axis representing capacity (not cumulative). The lines 
“SRMC” and “MRMC” represent the level of operational profit achieved by each 
generator under the respective scenarios and the line named, “ Required Op. Profit per 
MWhr”, gives the level of operating surplus per MWhr that is needed to recover a 
station’s capital debts. From the diagram it is easy to see that with the SRMC bid 
price, most stations do not cover their debts, with the exception of a few generating 
stations that make a surplus. But there can be no doubt that the MRMC provides a 
return to generators that covers their capital costs and still leaves supernormal 
surpluses. Take the Great Island generators as an example, which are represented in 
total by the fourth point of each line in Figure 6(b). According to the graph, Great 
Island falls short of capital repayments by over €60 per MWhr with the SRMC bid 
price and exceeds its requirement by over €700 per MWhr with the MRMC bid price.  
 
4.6 An interesting implication of our simulations arises for the case of wind energy 
 
At present, another important point of concern for system operators and policymakers 
is the effect of the connection of additional wind to the system. The grid operator 
must ensure the reliability of the system at all times and this can prove difficult when 
variability in the level of wind energy is high. On the other hand, policymakers would 
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like to see more wind energy, and renewables in general, on the system since wind 
and other renewables can offer security of supply by hedging the risk of fossil fuel 
price shocks. Generally speaking, renewables incur no costs other than its initial 
investment cost, which is usually high. In the case of wind energy, coupling this with 
its low level of availability means that the investor requires a return of approximately 
€45/MWhr to make the project viable. This is not a certainty in the energy market and 
so the government is supporting wind in the market through the Public Service 
Obligation. As expected, the model confirms that the return on wind is not sufficient 
to meet capital repayments. The per MW subsidies that would be required for wind to 
be commercially viable are as follows; 
 
  RoI All-Island 
SRMC  € 19.23  € 20.91 
MRMC  € 7.85  €10.25 
Table 4.7:  Subsidies Required For Wind  
 
4.7 Economic effects of the bid-price strategy  
 
Table 4.8 displays a table of the most salient results from our model simulations. 
Please note that all amounts are recorded in millions with the exception of Time 
Weighted Average price per MWhr, which is recorded in euros. 
    
  RoI     All-Island   
  SRMC MRMC  SRMC MRMC 
Time Weighted Ave. 
Price/MWhr 
€ 34.43  €162.12  € 32.50  € 115.07 
Total Revenue  € 862.33  € 4060.05    € 1093.45  € 3871.27 
Total Cost  € 488.92  € 645.50    € 565.40  € 696.53 
Total Fuel Cost  € 488.92  € 489.98    € 565.40  € 565.40 
Total Operating Profit
38 € 108.05  € 3149.20    € 197.27  € 2843.96 
Table 4.8: Results of Different Bidding Strategies under Different Market Structures 
 
                                                 
38 Total Operating Profit = (Total Revenue minus Total Fuel Cost) minus O&M Costs   31
First of all, it is apparent from the table that overall, an All-Island market is extremely 
beneficial to the Republic of Ireland. Costs are lower than under a “stand-alone” 
Republic of Ireland market under both the short-run and medium-run bid-price 
scenarios.  
  
The most notable feature of the table, however, is the difference in the Time Weighted 
Average Price. On average, it would cost almost five times as much to produce one 
MWhr of electricity with the MRMC bidding strategy than with the SRMC bid price 
in the Republic of Ireland, but only four times as much in the All-Island market.  So, 
regardless of the market structure, the Time Weighted Average Price is more than 
tripled under the MRMC bid-price. The Total Revenues associated with each strategy 
and market also reflects these multiples.  
 
Total Cost under the SRMC bid-price in each market represents only the cost of fuel, 
whereas Total Cost under the MRMC bid-price includes the total increases for all bid-
prices such that they allowed all generators to break-even. These increases were 
considered to stand for some level of variable costs.  The row “Total Fuel Cost” re-
iterates the fuel cost for the SRMC strategy and includes the fuel cost for the MRMC 
strategy, highlighting any difference. No major changes to the merit order in the All-
Island market indicate that the dispatch of plant is equally efficient under the two 
strategies. However, the Republic of Ireland figure indicates that the real increase in 
the cost of fuel from a less efficient dispatch is just over € 1 million per annum. This 
amount is model dependent and in actual fact could be larger since, unlike the real 
world, the model’s bid prices cannot change from period to period. The difference 
arises because more costly generators are chosen to produce when there are more 
efficient stations available. The difference lies in the change that these bids make to 
the merit order dispatch (cheapest first, dearest last) and subsequently to the Station 
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Figure 4.9: Republic of Ireland Station Marginal Cost Function 
 
The large increases in bid prices only begin to occur in mid-merit stations and as the 
system gets closer to full available capacity, these variations over and above the fuel 
price reach their largest, with a cap on the bid price of €2,000 plus fuel/MWhr. Figure 
4.9 highlights the difference between the two types of bidding strategies in the 
Republic of Ireland and illustrates that the changes in the bidding strategy do not 
cause any major differences in prices until the merit order reaches 3,000 cumulative 
MW’s of capacity. The price then begins to rise more sharply in the MRMC bid 
scenario. It is worth bearing in mind that the graph only shows the relationship up to 
€50 per MW, whereas prices associated with the MRMC curve actually rise far higher 
and reach the pre-determined cap of €2,000 per MW plus fuel cost. 
 
The disparity between the two strategies is more evident in the Republic of Ireland 
and one suggested reason for this could relate to how close the two systems are to full 
capacity. In 2003, the state of affairs in the two systems is very different; the South is 
in a position of under-capacity whilst the North has sufficient spare capacity and is 
exporting some electricity across the border. In a state of under-capacity, a system 
operator would need to employ nearly all of the available generation in the country 
and will therefore have to travel much further down the merit order of generators’ 
bids. The last station on the list would be the most expensive and if it were deployed 
to produce energy all other stations would make significant gains. If this happened on 
a regular basis, it could have serious cost implications for the consumer.  
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The final row of Table 4.8, Total Operating Profit, illustrates again the multiplier 
effect of increasing costs/bid-prices under the MRMC strategy. Since, consider that in 
the Republic of Ireland market, when the multiplier between SRMC TWAP and 
MRMC TWAP is nearly five and costs are as low as possible, the multiplier on 
Operating Profits between the two strategies is nearly thirty. This number is reduced 
to fourteen in an All-Island market.  
 
The process of rewarding inefficiency makes it harder to identify efficient dispatch 
and abuse of market power, as these inflated operating profits are better able to absorb 
losses. For instance, suppose that a generator bids in their MRMC cost. This price 
includes some or all of their O&M costs. Suppose also that, due to overstaffing, these 
day-to-day running costs are above the competitive level and could be considered 
inefficient. By including these costs in the bid price, not only does the company itself 
benefit from its own or any other company’s inefficiency, but it is the consumer who 
pays. What is needed is a transparent bidding process, which makes it easier to detect 
firms who are using the market to pay for their inefficiencies.  
 
It is accepted that, under the SRMC strategy, not all generators can cover their day-to-
day costs. It is then worth comparing the following; 
 
  RoI     All-Island   
  SRMC MRMC   SRMC MRMC 
Total Losses To Cover Costs  € 100.28      € 125.58   
New Total Revenue
39 € 962.61  € 4060.05    € 1219.03  € 3871.27 
New Total Op. Profit
37 € 208.33  € 3149.20    € 322.85  € 2843.96 
Note: All amounts are in millions 
Table 4.10: Cost of Covering Variable Costs in Each Market 
 
The first row of Table 4.10, “Total Losses To Cover Costs” highlights the total losses 
of all generators under the SRMC bidding structure in each market; €100.28m and 
€125.58m in the Republic of Ireland and All-Island markets respectively. These 
figures are the total O&M losses of all individual stations. They do not include 
                                                 
39 Losses only added on to the SRMC Revenue and Surplus since this is the only loss-making scenario 
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remuneration of capital. If these figures are added to the SRMC Total Revenue and 
Total Operating Profit of all generators in the economy, then all stations are capable 
of at least covering their fuel and O&M costs. A comparison can be drawn since both 
strategies now ensure that all medium-term costs are covered. The final row of Table 
4.10, New Total Operating Profit, shows that although the SRMC strategy only allows 
some generators to make a total contribution of approximately € 200m towards their 
capital repayments, it is possible to have a system that can support its own day-to-day 
costs for a fraction of the cost when compared with the MRMC situation, where all 
costs are extorted from the pool. The difference between the two is sizeable and 
therefore the cost to the economy could be substantial. Since if the aim is to produce 
energy at minimum cost to consumers, whilst also ensuring the viability of the 
companies producing the energy, the MRMC bidding strategy could be a massive 
overestimation, considering that a guarantee that all costs are covered in the long run 
could also be adequately provided by a payment for capacity mechanism. 
  
Each bidding mechanism proposes a different possible equilibrium for the Irish 
electricity market. Neither strategy is dynamically stable, as they do not ensure that 
the right price signals are sent to the market to produce a realistic and efficient mix of 
generating technologies, nor do they tell a story that is likely to hold in the long run. 
The SRMC scenario without support for capital remuneration, suggests a market 
where day-to-day losses will result in a deficient level of investment that will not 
ensure future security of supply. While the large operating profits attainable using the 
MRMC bid price structure imply that a significant level of over-investment would 
occur in the years shortly following this static equilibrium, mostly in the baseload 
sector since this form of generation earns the most operating profits. This situation 
would come at a considerable cost to consumers since the adjustment process could 
take a very long time, leaving the time Weighted Average Price very high.  
 
Lastly, in considering the two forms of bidding strategies, the nominal amounts of 
cost/revenue/operating profit are not as important as the relative difference between 
the SRMC and MRMC results. Contrasting the two as in Figure 10, reveals that it is 
possible to create a secure and transparent bidding-system with efficiency as the 
central premise. Consideration of a time dimension is also central to the investigation. 
Although the long run is not explicitly covered in this paper, the MRMC scenario can   35
be considered a possible theoretical long-run situation since it would give rise to new 
investment that would only be realised in the long run, given that the time it takes to 
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SECTION 5: ASSESSING MARKET POWER & DOMINANCE 
 
At present, the electricity market in the Republic of Ireland consists of one major 
player (the ESB) and a few substantially smaller players. The concern in the Republic 
of Ireland at the moment is that perceived dominance by ESB could discourage 
investment and lead to excessive prices. For the purposes of measuring the market 
power of the ESB and other industry participants, the model incorporates two 
exogenous indices, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Residual Supply Index 
(RSI)
40, and one endogenous index, Price Setting Ability (PSA)
41. 
 
5.1 Market Power Indices 
 
The HHI is the sum of squares of market shares of all firms in the market
42. If the 
HHI is in excess of 1,800, the market is generally considered highly concentrated and 
suppliers having an equivalent market share are believed to have potential market 
power. Both the number of firms and differences in their relative size influences the 
HHI.  
 
In standard commodity markets, market concentration and market power are linked 
such that they are almost one and the same, but in electricity markets, this is not the 
case. The HHI does not take account of factors such as demand inflexibility and 
transmission limits that sometimes result in excessive market power (Sheffrin et al, 
2004). Consequently, using only a static measure, such as the HHI, to calculate what 
is inherently a dynamic concept would not be optimal.  
 
The RSI is defined as the ratio of residual supply to demand, for an individual 
supplier S,    
 
RSIS = (Total Available Supply – Available Supply from Supplier S) / Demand 
 
                                                 
40 See “Watching Watts To Prevent Abuse of Power” by Sheffrin, Chen & Hobbs – IEEE Magazine 
July/August 2004. 
41 PSA is a percentage indicating in how many half hour periods a station sets the system price. 
42 The total market share of independents was divided by the number of independent outlets and then 
squared and aggregated - all independents are assumed to be of equal size.   37
“The RSI measures how pivotal suppliers may be in setting prices based on the 
residual supply left, without their capacity, to serve demand. A supplier is deemed 
“pivotal” if it can withdraw its capacity from the market and induce a shortage” 
(Sheffrin  et al, 2004). This tool was initially created to assess the Californian 
electricity crisis of 2000/2001.  
 
“When a supplier is pivotal, its RSIS is less than 1.0 and the potential for market 
power abuse is most serious. When a supplier is not pivotal, the RSIS is greater than 
1.0 and the supplier does not have absolute market power … The experience in 
California showed that when one or more RSIS’s were below 1.2, there was 
significant market power. Only when all RSIS’s were above 1.2 was there sufficient 
competition in the market place” (Sheffrin et al, 2004). 
 
The RSI is a continuous metric and thus we can compute a RSI value for each period 
 and for each supplier. However, for the purposes of this paper averages over the year 
have been calculated and the Sheffrin et al standard of 1.2 will be employed, against 
which all RSI results will be measured. The RSI is influenced by the size of the 
company but also by the reserve margin/tightness of the market. 
 
The Price Setting Ability (PSA) of each generator refers to the percentage of periods 
in the year that each generator sets the price. It is apparent that a multi-generator 
company with some baseload and mid-merit plant has a better opportunity of setting 
the price, and thus the price paid to all generators, than a single-station company. In 
practice, either a baseload or mid-merit generator usually sets the price.  
 
5.2 Market power indices for the ESB
43
 
Six years ago, the ESB was a monopolist. Now, the company must compete with new 
more efficient generators whilst retaining its obligation as “seller of last resort”. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present ESB’s market position, including estimates of its market 
power, for the SRMC and MRMC bidding strategies in respect of the “stand alone” 
RoI market structure and the hypothecated All-Island structure respectively. 
  
                                                 
43 Synergen is not considered part of the ESB portfolio in any results for the ESB for this section.   38
 
  SRMC MRMC 
Price Setting Ability  91%  91% 
% Generation  73%  73% 
% MW Generated  64%  64% 
Ave. Utilisation  35%  36% 
Operating Profit  € 36.12 m  € 2,306.97 m 
RSI Ave.  0.39  0.39 
HHI (RoI Market) 5,309  5,347 
Table 5.1: ESB’s market position in the “stand alone” Republic of Ireland market 
 
The ESB holds 73% of physical capacity, but in terms of actual megawatts generated 
this figure drops to 64%. The state-owned company has stated that it is committed to 
reducing its market share to 60% of all megawatts generated
44. It is clear that the ESB 
is approaching this target. The HHI for the Republic of Ireland market is very high 
(5,309) and the RSI for the ESB (0.39) is only one third of what has been taken to 
represent a competitive market (1.2). In addition, an ESB plant sets the price 91% of 
the time during the year and with this ability comes the possibility of increasing the 
price even further.  
 
The assessment for the ESB in a Republic of Ireland market must then be that it 
retains significant market power through its large portfolio of plant. The picture in the 
Republic of Ireland is similar regardless of the bidding strategy employed. The level 
of market power associated with each company under each bidding structure, 
expressed in terms of the RSI, is effectively the same since it solely depends on the 
amount of generation owned by a particular company and the level of demand. 
Nevertheless, the model does highlight the importance of ownership of baseload and 
mid-merit plant in a company’s ability to set the price. Focussing on Moneypoint, it is 
easy to see that ownership of this 855MW
45 plant brings with it much power. 
Moneypoint is a baseload coal-fired station that generates roughly one third of all the 
energy produced in the Republic of Ireland. Even if the ESB owned only Moneypoint, 
they might still be considered to have a good deal of market power since industry 
                                                 
44 See ESB Press Release No. 145 
45 Export capacity   39
participants may fear the outcome of a sudden breakdown of one or all of the three 
generating units on the site.  
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates that moving to an All-Island integrated system reduces ESB’s 
hold on the market. 
 
  SRMC MRMC 
Price Setting Ability  67%  73% 
% Generation  58%  58% 
% MW Generated  45%  44% 
Ave. Utilisation  30%  31% 
Operating Profit  € 5.35 m  € 4,420.73 m 
RSI Ave.  0.66  0.66 
HHI (Total All-Island Market) 3,513  3,513 
Table 5.2: ESB’s market position in the All-Island Market 
 
It is evident that the ESB’s market share would be significantly reduced. The HHI and 
RSI have been halved and doubled respectively. Moreover, the ESB’s price setting 
capability would have reduced to 67%-73%. The conclusion must therefore be that an 
All-Island system would greatly assist in addressing the dominance issue. However, it 
would not be enough. 
 
5.3 The exercise of market power 
 
In electricity markets there are generally two ways to increase the price paid to all 
generators. The direct method involves one/all generator(s) raising their bid-price. If 
only one generator raises its price, the only way that it can increase the price paid to 
all generators is, if it is the price setting station. This form of market power is hard to 
predict, as it is hard to pinpoint the exact level of demand required in a period and the 
bids of other generators. However, if a company owns many generators, it can 
increase the bid-price of all its generating units and subsequently increase its chances 
of increasing its revenues, or, generators could collude with one another to agree that 
each generator will raise its bid by a certain amount, therefore raising the system 
marginal price for all stations. The indirect method uses outages to disguise strategic   40
unavailability. By claiming that a station is unavailable, a generator forces the System 
Operator further down the price-increasing merit order. This tactic ensures that all 
generators receive a higher payment per MW than would be secured if all operational 
generators were available. Only companies with a portfolio of generators would find 
it worthwhile to exploit this indirect course of action. It is also possible to combine 
both the direct and indirect methods by withholding a station from the market and 
simultaneously raising the price of the company’s other generating units.  
 
The possible outcomes associated with the direct method and a combination of the 
direct and indirect method, are endless since they are dependant on the prices 
involved and the size of the output that is withheld. For this reason, only the effects of 
withholding capacity from the market, holding everything else constant, can be 
examined with any transparency.  
 
Table 5.3 illustrates the “withholding gains” for the ESB, that arise if it were to shut 
down some of its most marginal stations
46, in a Republic of Ireland market with a 
SRMC bid price strategy. This will be compared to the 2003 general base case of all 
generating stations being fully operational. In the table the base situation regarding 




  ESB Edenderry Dublin 
Bay 
Viridian Wind Economy PSA
47 
of ESB 
Aghada  Total 
Cost 
1.01  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.01  1.02 
  Total 
Op. 
Profit 






1.05  1.12  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.04  0.95 
  Total 
Op. 
Profit 
1.20  1.45  2.10  2.32 1.07 1.22   
                                                 
46 ESB plants which set the system price most often 
47 Price Setting Ability – % of periods in the year that an ESB station sets the System Marginal Price. 
48 Only 1 unit of Poolbeg CCGT is switched off i.e. 1 x 230MW plant    41
Table 5.3: Gains from withdrawing a station from the RoI market under the SRMC bidding strategy, 
relative to the base = 1.00 
 
It must be mentioned that stations were withdrawn for the entire year to avoid any 
other factors contributing to the effect, such as time of year and scheduled outages by 
other larger stations. The stations chosen are of medium size; Aghada and Poolbeg 
CCGT are 258 MW’s and 230 MW’s respectively. So the system operator would have 
to go a good deal further down the merit order to make up for their withdrawal from 
the market. This in turn causes the cost to the economy and operating profits of the 
generators to rise. 
 
Taking Aghada as an example; if the ESB switched off Aghada, their costs would 
increase by 1% since stations further down the merit order in their portfolio would be 
contracted to generate by the System Operator. However, this increase in costs would 
be more than offset by the 37% increase in operating profit that they would receive 
from having more expensive stations setting the system marginal price. Stations that 
are already working to full capacity such as Edenderry, Dublin Bay and Viridian, 
would see no increase in their costs but their operating profit would rise by 33%, 59% 
and 71% respectively. These figures also impact on the economy, where total cost to 
the economy would increase by 1% but overall total operating profit in the industry 
would increase by 21%.  Finally, in relation to the parallel effects under the MRMC 
bid price, it is only worth mentioning that the increases associated wit the SRMC 
scenario are tiny in comparison. 
 
5.4 Divestiture of generating assets 
 
Economic theory suggests that four or five independent players in an oligopolistic 
market should be sufficient to prevent any player abusing its position. To test this 
assumption on the Irish electricity industry, an arbitrary method
49 was devised by 
which the ESB was broken up into smaller companies. These groups were tested for 
market power using the technique applied to the 2003 base case. The groups are then 
                                                 
49 1. ESB stations placed in groups based on site location. 
    2. All corresponding data summed together to give relevant data based on site 
    3. Rank sites by most to least profitable  
    4. Using this order, the plants are split into three, four and five companies.   42
tested for the effects of the strategic withholding of supply and their ability to set 
price, as well as compiling the associated market indices such as the HHI and RSI. 
 
In view of the fact that the All-Island market contributes to the reduction of market 
power
50, only All-Island groups are considered here. As an example, the table below 
shows the ESB
51 split into three companies in an All-Island economy; 
 
G1 G2 G3 
Moneypoint  Poolbeg CCGT  Poolbeg Steam 
Aghada Aghada  CT  Ardnacrusha 
Erne Great  Island  Marina 
North Wall  Lee  Clady 
Liffey Coolkeragh  Tarbert 
Table 5.4: Assumed divestiture of ESB assets 
 
  G1 G2 G3 
RSI  1.2 1.32  1.29 
% PSA  0.13 0.32 0.28 
% Generation  0.23 0.16 0.19 
Market HHI  1,300    
Table 5.5: Market power outcomes following divestiture of the ESB’s generating assets (All-Island 
market structure assumed) 
 
These indices are consistent with the requirements for a competitive industry. All RSI 
figures are at or above the required 1.2 level, indicating that no one company is 
pivotal in the supply of energy. Group 2 sets the system price most often, 32% of the 
time. Summing the above % PSA’s
52 highlights the fact that independents are setting 
the price 27% of the time. No one player is cornering the market and the HHI is below 
the required level of 1,800. Thus it seems that with three independent, roughly equally 
sized companies, that have a diverse portfolio, a competitive situation might exist.  
 
                                                 
50 See Table 5.2. 
51 Shannonbridge, Lanesboro & Bellacorrick are always part of the ESB portfolio since they are due to 
be retired shortly after 2003 and would not be for sale. G1 will be considered to represent ESB for this 
purpose. 
52 Price Setting Ability – % of periods in the year that an ESB station sets the System Marginal Price.   43
It is accepted that, first, the results may be highly dependent on the way in which the 
groups were fashioned and second, the analysis is static and at best provides an 
underestimate of the competitive effects since we can expect technical and economic 
efficiencies to follow divestiture. However, considering these figures by way of 
assumption can only involve comparing the possible cost reductions due to divestiture 
with the possible savings credited to economies of scale. 
 
5.5 The effect of withholding of supply under divestiture 
 
Both the SRMC and MRMC pricing structures will be examined here with respect to 
the withholding of capacity from the market. The effects of withholding stations from 
the market are considered from two perspectives; 
•  If a company turns off one of its own stations, will its operating profits 
increase? 
•  If a company turns off one of its own stations, will it set the price more often? 
 
If divestiture is successful and offers a first-best solution, the answer to both of these 
questions should be no. There should be a reduction in the company’s operating 
profits and its ability to set price. This would ensure that there is no incentive to 
strategically withhold capacity from the market. 
 
Using the SRMC prices gives the most efficient dispatch for generation and will 
therefore give the most economical answers. Thus, these outcomes will be used as the 
base case with which to compare the answers of the MRMC price strategy. 
 
PRICE: SRMC 
  G1 G2 G3 
 Op.  Profit %  PSA Op.  Profit % PSA Op.  Profit %  PSA 
Group 1
53 (-)  (-)  (+) (-)  (+) (+) 
Group 2
54 (+) (+) (-)  (-)  (+) (+) 
Group 3
55 (+) (+) (+) (-)  (-)  (-) 
                                                 
53 Moneypoint was chosen from Group 1 for both SRMC and MRMC. 
54 Poolbeg CCGT (1 unit) was chosen from Group 2 for both SRMC and MRMC.   44
                                                                                                                                           
Table 5.6: Effects of abuse of market power on operating profits and price setting ability under 
divestiture, using SRMC prices. 
 
Table 5.6 gives the results to the questions for the newly divested companies, under 
the SRMC bid price scenario. The first two columns of Figure 19 refer to the effects 
on Group 1, when each Group turns off one particular station in its portfolio. For 
example, if Group2
56 turns off Aghada, Group 1’s Operating Profits will increase for 
two possible reasons; now a higher priced station is setting the system marginal price 
and/or more of Group 1’s stations are required since Group 2’s available capacity has 
been reduced. However, the interesting point relates to the effects of Group 2’s 
strategic unavailability on itself. Not only will Group 2 lose money but it will also 
lose some of its power to set the price. This is also the case for Group 1 and 3 when 
one of their own stations is suddenly unavailable. This illustrates that it is possible to 
have a market where there is no incentive to game or exert market power. This 
approach makes the regulators job easier since the process is more transparent. 
 
From Table 5.7 it is clear that this level of transparency is not obtainable with the 
MRMC bid structure under the same circumstances. The common result of a double-
minus ((-),(-)) has been replaced mainly with a plus followed by a minus ((+),(-)). 
This means that under the MRMC bid, if a Group turns off one of its stations, 
although it will lose some of its price setting ability (-) it will make money (+). This is 
represented by an increase in its operating profits. This result is due to the inflationary 
effects of the MRMC bid, caused by the differences in the bidding prices. Therefore, 
under an MRMC bidding strategy, a second best solution may only be possible  
((+),(-)). Even though Table 5.7 gives a second-best solution, ((+),(-)), the result could 
also be plus-plus ((+),(+)). This would indicate that it would be advantageous for 
Group 1 to switch off a station as it would increase Group 1’s operating profit and the 
amount of times that it sets that system marginal price. This result is in no way 





55 Poolbeg Steam (1 unit) was chosen from Group 3 for both SRMC and MRMC. 
56 The stations chosen are the most marginal in each group, with the exception of Moneypoint, which 
was chosen for its significance.   45
PRICE: MRMC 
  G1   G2   G3   
  Op. Profit  % PSA  Op. Profit % PSA  Op. Profit  % PSA 
Group 1  (+)  (+)  (+) (-)  (+) (+) 
Group 2  (+) (+) (+)  (-)  (+) (+) 
Group 3  (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)  (-) 
Table 5.7: Effects of abuse of market power on operating profits and price setting ability under 
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SECTION 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
We focus on three areas in drawing conclusions from our analysis 
 
•  An integrated All-island market structure versus the status quo 
•  SRMC versus MRMC bid-price strategies 
•  Divestiture of ESB generating assets 
 
6.1 All-Island market structure option 
 
The results of modelling both the bid structure and numeric indices representing 
market power, with respect to the Republic of Ireland and All-Island market, suggest 
that the All-Island energy market is a worthwhile initiative. This conclusion is based 
on figures that show that the new All-Island market would reduce the total cost of 
electricity production to the economy by at least 6%
57, which should result in lower 
prices to consumers. It is also worth noting that the All-Island market would offer 
improved security of supply
58. With regard to the issue of dominance, the model 
estimates that the ESB’s market share will be reduced to approximately 45% of all 
MW’s generated
59, although they will retain almost 60% of physical capacity in the 
market. The Ballylumford generators in Northern Ireland play a vital role in these 
conclusions since together, they reduce the ESB’s market share by 11% and the 
ESB’s price setting ability by 21% - 27%. However, the solution regarding the 
specific design of the electricity market and the bid-price strategy is more 
complicated.  
 
6.2 The preferred bid-price strategies? 
 
If the goal is to produce electricity at least cost in a market where transparency exists 
for regulators and investors alike, then the SRMC bid structure is clearly preferred 
according to our simulations. This conclusion emerges because of the inherent 
                                                 
57 6% difference in SRMC TWAP’s / 29% difference in MRMC TWAP’s 
58 For a detailed understanding of this topic, see “Generation Adequacy in an Island Electricity 
System”, J. FitzGerald, ESRI Working Paper No. 161. 
59 Based on 2003 demand and station availability.   47
deficiencies in the MRMC strategy itself, but also because of the merits of the market 
characteristics that the SRMC strategy produces.  
 
The MRMC bidding strategy makes available to generators the opportunity to recoup 
all forms of cost through the market. This formulation does not aid in the 
determination of “least cost” since less efficient stations are not openly penalised for 
their inefficiencies. This is left at the discretion of market participants, who can 
choose to act competitively and reduce the price until it reaches a competitive level, 
or, keep prices artificially high to the benefit of all generators. Either, all generators 
opt to keep bid-prices at a level such they cover at least their medium-run costs and all 
stations benefit equally. This is what the model has shown. Or on the other hand, 
since each generator knows that it could run for a lower bid-price in the short-run, 
generators may decide to undercut the MRMC price to ensure production. This form 
of competition would eventually results in the SRMC outcome. Essentially, without a 
benchmark cost that creates a competitive environment under which, all participants 
can compete equally, the market is more unstable than is necessary, and could 
possibly reach a point of equilibrium identical to the benchmark cost case.  
 
The model demonstrates that a market with a SRMC bid-price structure would not be 
sufficient to allow generators to recover all of their costs. Some generators make 
enough to make a small contribution to capital remuneration, but some cannot even 
cover day-to-day O&M costs. This market is not sustainable and so additional 
mechanism(s) and/or incentive(s) would be required to ensure that each station could 
cover its costs in the long run. For example, using a capacity payment to affect market 
participants’ decisions would help to establish the appropriate environment by 
introducing a higher degree of certainty for generators and investors. However, the 
SRMC does succeed in producing a market at least cost. So coupling this with a 
capacity mechanism would help ensure a least cost competitive portfolio of plant for 
the economy. In addition, the SRMC bid structure also demonstrates that it is possible 
to have an outcome with little or no incentive to game and where abuse of a position 
can be identified and hence regulated. Therefore, a market based on the SRMC bid 
structure would facilitate regulation since it brings greater transparency to the cost 
structure and therefore increases the likelihood of identifying abuse of market power. 
   48
The extremity of the outcomes suggested by the alternative bid structures will, in 
some way create unstable equilibria. The SRMC structure will see problems 
incentivising new entry, as operating profits are minimal. Neither of these sub-optimal 
solutions is secure in the long-run, however, it is harder to recover from the MRMC 
outcome than it is to create a competitive mix of generation using the SRMC concept 
as the basis.  
 
In essence, it is not the absolute level of costs that is worrying, but rather the effects 
on the economy of the ease with which it is possible for a generator to inflate their 
bid-price and thus conceal cost-based inefficiencies, if they are not tied to some 
benchmark cost. The conclusion must therefore be that the SRMC scenario offers the 
economy the best chance of providing a fair, least cost and secure electricity market, 
but only if this pricing system recognises that there must be support by means of some 
form of capacity payment. 
 
6.3 Divestiture of ESB generating assets 
 
Divestiture of ESB generators into smaller companies is considered by many to be the 
only way to ensure greater competition in the market. The model indicates that the 
ESB’s dominance in the market at present is very strong, but, splitting ESB 
Generation into a minimum of three separate companies
60, would yield results 
consistent with a competitive market. Whether this route should be embarked on is 
open to several questions, many of which are outside the scope of this paper to 
consider. However, it will be helpful to consider some of the likely benefits and 
drawbacks of divestiture, as well as, looking at some of the alternatives. 
 
Divestiture is likely to be a costly endeavour. Care would have to be taken when 
applying structural reform. In the production of electricity several resources are 
shared across generators within the same company and duplication of these services 
will prove to be expensive. In addition, some areas of the system may suffer from 
transmission inadequacy and be less attractive to investors, or, labour unions could 
make the situation even more complex. For these, and many other reasons, successful 
structural reform would be both difficult and costly. As against this, one would expect 
                                                 
60 Using 2003 data and prices.   49
both technical and economic efficiency gains subsequent to divestiture, which could 
go some considerable way towards offsetting the costs that are likely to be involved. 
 
There are a number of alternatives to the divestiture option considered here. We could 
instead allow the market to evolve which would permit the nascent competitive forces 
to assume a greater importance. As an exercise to illustrate the implications of what is 
effectively a “wait and see strategy” we use the model to simulate the outcomes for 
levels of concentration in the All-Island market for 2007 and 2010
61, if no divestiture 
takes place;  
   
  Year ESB
62 Viridian 
63 Ballylumford Kilroot Indepts
64




0.16    
0.18 




0.25    
0.23 




0.08    
0.07 
0.09          
0.08 
0.02   
0.02 
0.42    
0.39 




0.12    
0.10 




0.53   
0.49 




1.60     
1.57 
1.58          
1.55 
1.70   
1.66 
 
Market HHI   2007 
2010 
       2,332 
2,053 
Table 6.1: Indicators of electricity market concentration, 2007 and 2010 for the All-Island market 
scenario 
 
While it is apparent that the market could still be considered highly concentrated in 
2007 and 2010, there is nevertheless an appreciable improvement in the indices of 
market power. Moreover, the combined market share of Independent Power Producers 
(IPP’s) is growing. This is due to entry by new and existing IPP’s and increasing 
levels of renewables on the system. This simulation suggests that a strategy of “wait 
and see” may have some merit over a one-shot divestiture of the ESB’s generating 
assets.  
                                                 
61 Using 2003 prices.  
62 Coolkeragh CCGT is part of the ESB portfolio, whereas Synergen is not considered part of the ESB 
portfolio. 
63 Huntstown 2 presumed operational by 2007. 
64 Includes Interconnector of 500 MW’s in 2007 and 1000 MW’s in 2010.   50
 
It is evident, however, that the ESB will still retain considerable market power by 
2007 or 2010, as judged, for example by the RSI, which is much lower for the ESB 
than for its multi-generator competitors. It will be useful, therefore, to consider a more 
modest divestiture of its assets. For instance, in Table 6.2 we consider the impact on 
the market for electricity in an All-Island context by 2010 of divesting the ESB of 




66 Ballylumford Kilroot Indepts
67
% PSA  0.32 0.18  0.19  0.01  0.30 
% Generation  0.39 0.07  0.08  0.02  0.43 
% Generated  0.29 0.10  0.05  0.03  0.52 
RSI (ave.)  1.01 1.57  1.55  1.66   
Market HHI          1,793 
Table 6.2: Projected All-Island Market Concentration in 2010 where ESB has shed some price setting 
capacity 
 
The simulation confirms that if the ESB were to shed approximately 500 MW of 
price-setting capacity, this together with the adoption of a “wait and see” strategy – 
would be likely to result in a competitive outcome by 2010. The resulting RSI of 1.04, 
although below the advised rate of 1.2, is not dependant on the type of generation sold 
and so taking into consideration that the stations being considered for divestiture often 
set the system marginal price, in terms of market power, the conclusion must be more 
favourable than the original 1.04. Even if not, the outcome illustrates that 
limited/targeted divestment is a credible alternative to complete divestment. This 
more gradual model of structural reform evidently takes much longer to achieve than 
a “one-shot” divestiture of the ESB assets, but it may prove more attractive to all 
involved, as it ensures stability in a core part of business activity for all consumers of 
electricity in the economy. It is worth noting that a similar outcome could also be 
achieved if one or more of the existing IPP’s increased their market share. 
 
                                                 
65 Coolkeragh CCGT is part of the ESB portfolio, whereas Synergen is not considered part of the ESB 
portfolio. 
66 Huntstown 2 presumed operational by 2007. 
67 Includes Interconnector of 1000 MW’s in 2010 and the 500 MW’s of capacity shed by the ESB to 
the Independent Sector.    51
Interconnection plays a key role in the above results. It is anticipated that by 2010, a 
second East-West interconnector will provide an additional 500MW of capacity. In an 
All-Island market this would mean a total of 1,000 MW’s of interconnection to the 
U.K. Since the Irish market is relatively small compared to mainland Europe, it is 
possible that at some stage the Irish market may become part of the electricity market 
in Great Britain. This would come about if sufficient interconnection between the two 
islands meant that the cheapest price in the Irish market was actually the price of 
electricity delivered from the UK via the interconnector.  
 
Since our model excludes the possibility of scale economies or “learning by doing” 
cost reductions, we overestimate the costs and underestimate the operating profits of 
any multi-plant company. The sub-additivity aspect of the cost function with respect 
to shared resources, however, cannot be overlooked. Taking this into consideration, it 
may seem that the ESB has extra benefits and reasons to hold onto older plant, but 
one must remember that although some independent generators may have only one 
station in Ireland, they too may belong to a bigger worldwide portfolio that can pool 
resources across countries or at least between their stations within a country.   
However, even if no actual scale economies are achieved, a company’s ability to buy 
electricity or fuel in bulk, for security or discounting purposes, is based on its 
portfolio capacity. When buying fuel, small-scale generators are disadvantaged since 
they cannot contract to buy forward at the same rate as the multiplant company.   
 
There may be lessons to be learned in this regard from the U.K. experience with the 
liberalisation of the gas and electricity markets. So far the UK has experienced 
problems relating to divestiture, given that the industry has witnessed the re-
integration of many of the companies that were originally divested by region. When 
the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was divested in 1990, ownership of 
the transmission division, National Grid Company passed to twelve regional 
distribution companies (REC’s) that were also created. Following this, these REC’s 
were privatised. However, the Government retained the “golden share” in these 
companies to prevent any takeovers. In 1995 the Government sold its remaining 
shares. Acquisitions occurred in the form of mergers and many REC’s integrated with 
U.K. generators to form vertically integrated companies. There is no doubt that some 
of these decisions were motivated by the benefits associated with economies of scale.   52
Besides this, many liberalised electricity industries have experienced problems 
relating to new investment in electricity generation. For instance, new entrants have 
mainly built baseload plant.   
 
Finally, all markets depend on the life cycle of the commodity.  The product cycle in 
electricity industries relies on the life cycle of the generating asset, which is usually 
thirty years. As a result, decisions should be made with consideration for this 
timeframe. Applying this to the problem of ESB dominance in ownership of mid-
merit plant means that this problem is partly time dependent. In other words, with 
careful planning of new investment and ownership, this problem could be reduced if 
not eliminated. Thus, in trying to ensure an outcome that is close to a competitive 
market structure and to reinforce the confidence of putative investors, there is much to 
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APPENDIX 1:  
An Overview of the Market for Electricity in Ireland  
 
The provision of electricity to an island, isolated and on the periphery of Europe can 
be difficult. Both parts of the island, North and South, have their own electricity 
system and are connected via one interconnector. Northern Ireland is further 
connected to Great Britain via another interconnector and the Republic of Ireland is 
considering the construction of an interconnector from the Republic to Great Britain. 
Previous to deregulation, the State in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland, 
was responsible for the provision of electricity in the respective countries. Electricity 
was provided by two state-owned monopolies, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) in 
the South and Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE) in Northern Ireland. These 
companies had sole responsibility for all aspects of electricity production; 
transmission, generation and distribution. 
 
In the 1980’s the British Government slowly began opening up the energy market and 
other state monopolies to competition. In March 1991 the British Government 
published a White Paper entitled “Privatisation of Northern Ireland Electricity” and in 
June 1993 Northern Ireland Electricity was floated on the stock market
68. Great 
Britain was one of the first countries to pioneer this and the European Union (EU) 
shortly followed suit. In December 1996, all EU countries adopted the European 
Community energy Directive 96/92/EC. In the Republic of Ireland, the European 
Electricity Directive was enacted through the Electricity Regulation Act 1999. This 
Act established an “independent body responsible for regulating and overseeing the 
liberalisation of Ireland’s energy sector” to be known as the Commission for Energy 
Regulation (CER).  
 
The CER – the Regulator – is responsible for the licensing of all electricity generation 
and transmission, whilst also ensuring free and fair access to the national transmission 
and distribution systems, as well as regulating charges for such access
69. The 
Regulator also enforces Directive 96/92, which addresses the opening up of the Irish 
                                                 
68 For a more detailed discussion see - ESRI PRS No.24 (Ch.3): “Electricity Privatisation: The 
Northern Ireland Experience”, by Michael McGurnaghan. 
69 Taken from the CER website at http://www.cer.ie/about_us.asp.   56
                                                
electricity market to competition. In the Republic, the aim is to reduce the 
incumbents’ (that is, the ESB’s) market share to sixty percent
70 and also to allow non-
domestic and domestic customers to choose their supplier by 2005 and 2007 
respectively
71. Since this process began much sooner in Northern Ireland, similar but 
not identical functions are performed by the Office for the Regulation of Electricity 
and Gas (OFREG), which is part of the Northern Ireland Authority for Energy 
Regulation (NIAER).  
 
Prior to the changes imposed by the EU, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB) 
controlled one hundred percent of the consumer market and almost one hundred 
percent of electricity generation in the Republic of Ireland
72. “ESB National Grid”, 
“ESB Power Generation” and “ESB Customer Supply” were the respective divisions 
within the ESB accountable for transmission, generation and distribution. Following 
the EU Directive it became necessary for these three departments to become separate 
legal entities
73. In Northern Ireland different companies perform these functions. The 
“System Operator of Northern Ireland (SONI)” is responsible for transmission and 
three generating companies have the right to produce electricity. The distribution of 
electricity differs slightly to that operating in the Republic of Ireland. “NIE Supply” is 
obliged under the terms of its licence to source its electricity from generators under 
contract to NIE’s “Power Procurement Business (NIE PPB)”
74. NIE Supply enters 
into short-, medium- and long-term contracts with the generators to supply electricity. 
These contracts are not statutory in the Republic. With regard to the actual 
distribution of electricity to customers, the two systems are similar. For example, if a 
consumer is large enough, it is possible to choose a supplier within its respective 
market.  
 
Moving to a competitive market implies that governments will no longer be able to 
directly control such issues as type and location of generation. Yet it is still their 
responsibility to secure supply and ensure environmental targets are met. At present, 
 
70 See ESB Press Release No. 145 
71 See ESB Press Release No. 108 
72 See Electricity Market Addresses Deregulation and Capacity Constraints at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr-81131e.html. 
73 For a brief overview of the ESB see http://www.esb.ie/main/about_esb/index.jsp. 
74 Market Opening in the North, brief overview by OFREG at 
http://ofreg.nics.gov.uk/Electicity%20Market%20Background.htm.   57
                                                
both electricity systems are at different stages of deregulation but looking forward, the 
problems they face are identical. Combining the two systems would give a larger 
single market where trading could be carried out systematically rather than 
opportunistically to take advantage of price differentials or congestion problems. The 
potential benefits from an integrated electricity system would include more 
competitive, secure and sustainable energy supplies. Both governments and regulators 
have cooperated extensively on an All-Island wholesale electricity market, and have 
produced a document outlining the development framework
75. It is anticipated that the 

























75 See “All-Island Energy Market Development Framework” accessible at www.dcmnr.ie  58
APPENDIX 2  
A Formal Exposition of the Electricity Supply Model 
 
2.1 Model variables 
 
i = 1,…,58      = number of generating stations 
j = 1,…,17520   = number of 30 minute supply periods in a year 
 
Pi :  Price of fuel per MWhr (coal, oil, gas, peat) 
IPj :  Interconnector Price of electricity 
•  Sell price of electricity in great Britain 
•  Import price of electricity 
Ei :  Station Efficiency (of technology) 
•  Affects the amount of fuel required by the station in order to produce 
electricity (in-house fuel requirement) 
•  High efficiency infers low in-house fuel requirement 
pi :  Pi / Ei = price of fuel per MWhr 
pi,j :This column vector is repeated for every time period and altered such that 
the last row of pi,j is the IPj row vector of interconnector electricity prices 
Ci :  Station Operation and Maintenance Costs  
CPi,j :  Station Capacity: This column vector is repeated for every time period    
Ai :  Station Availability 
•  A station is not available for 100% of the year 
•  (1 – x%) = time set aside for planned/scheduled maintenance 
Dj :  System Demand 
•  the amount of electricity the is required in the Republic of Ireland, or, 
on an All-Island basis ( RoI + NI ) for each 30 minute period of 2003 
T :  Threshold 
•  a ceiling on the final price per MWhr  
•  limited to €2,000 + pi 
SF :  Scale Factor 
•  facilitates studying future year such as 2007 or 2010 
•  load profile is assumed to remain unchanged 
Ai,x :  Day Constraints   59
•  Binary matrix: 0/1 = station Off/On for every 30 minute period of each 
day 
•  Ai of hydro stations are also taken account of here 
Bi,y :  Year Constraints 
•  Binary matrix: 0/1 = station Off/On for every day in the year 
•  Ai of all stations with the exception of hydro stations taken account of 
here 
Oi,j :  On Or Off 
•  Using Ai,x and  Bi,y  
•  Indicates whether each station is available or not for every 30 minute 
period of the year 
OPi :  Operational Cost per MWhr 
•  Vector created but remains empty until the end of the first iteration. 
•  Allows for an increase in pi if losses occur at the end of each iteration 
 
2.2 Model computational process 
 
CCi,j :  Constrained Capacity 
SCi,j :  Summed/Cumulative Capacity 
TCj :  Total Capacity 
PCi,j :  Production Capacity 
RCj :  Residual Capacity 
ICi,j :  Individual Capacity 
SPj :  System Price 
 
2.3 Model outputs 
 
In each 30-minute supply period, the Model can compute 
 
RVi,j :  Revenue 
CTi,j :  Cost 
 
For each station in the year, the Model can compute 
   60
STGi : Total electricity generated 
STRi :  Total Revenue 
STCi :  Total Cost 
STSi :  Total Surplus = total revenue minus total cost 
STPi :  Total Operating Profit = total surplus minus O&M costs 
 
For the relevant market (or economy) in the year, the Model can compute 
 
ETG :  Total Generated 
ETR :  Total Revenue 
ETC :  Total Cost 
ETS :  Total Surplus 
ETP :  Total Operating Profit 
 
For each MWhr that is produced by each generating station, the Model can compute 
 
RPMi : Revenue per MWhr 
CPMi : Cost per MWhr 
OPMi : Operation and Maintenance Cost per MWhr 
PPMi : Operating Profit per MWhr 
 
SUi :  Station Utilisation  
 
2.4 An overview of how the model works 
 
The most important variables in the model are the following 
 
pi,j : matrix (58x17520) of bid-prices 
CPi,j : matrix of capacities  
Oi,j : matrix of availabilities 
Dj : row vector of required system demand 
 
The first and most significant component of the model is the simple stack model 
characteristic of supply in electricity markets. Put simply, this requires sorting pi for each j, such that the lowest price is first and the highest price is last. So within each 
time period (j), stations are ranked in ascending order, with the cheapest generator 
being first and the dearest last. Then for each j, the following is true; 
 
P1,j < P2,j < P3,j  < P4,j <…    ∀j   (1) 
 
Next, it is necessary to cross-reference the availability of a station with its capacity. 
This gives a vector for each j, indicating the Constrained Capacity that each station is 
capable of producing   
 
CCi,j = Oi,j x CPi,j       ( 2 )  
 
It is important to note that all relevant station information must be in the same order. 
We then use the ranking for each j of pi,j, obtained from the sort, and project it onto 
each j of CCi,j. 
 
The second part of the program uses binary relational operators of “greater than” and 
“less than” to identify all the generating stations that will be required to generate 
electricity such that supply is exactly equal to demand.  
 
For each j, the Model creates the Cumulative Capacity vector, SCi,j, associated with 
each j of CCi,j. Then the following is true; 
 
SCi,j < SCi+1,j     ∀j    (3) 
 
Next, compare the system demand, Dj, with the cumulative capacity vector SCi,j for 
each j. 
 
Dj > / < SCi,j = 1 / 0        (4) 
 
The binary matrix (Y) identifies all stations required by the System Operator, up to 
and including the “Marginal Station”, that is the last station required that is required 
to generate, which usually does not operate to its full capacity. 
 
By multiplying Yi,j by CPi,j we can calculate many other important pieces of 
information. 
 
The amount of electricity that each station will be requested to produce in each time 
period, with the exception of the marginal station, is given by the Production Capacity 
 
PCi,j = Y x CPi,j     (5) 
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of each column of PCi,j, we can identify the Residual Capacity that must be produced 
by the marginal station in each period 
 
RCj = Dj - TCj      ( 6 )  
 
So, the Individual Capacity that each station must produce in each period is given by; 
 
ICi,j = RCi,j + PCi,j     (7) 
 
Finally, the System Price, SPj, corresponds to the pi,j offered by the Marginal Station 
foe each j. 
 
Before calculating various output variables, it is necessary to re-assemble the stations 
in their correct order. 
 
In each period 
 
•  A station’s revenue is;    RVi,j = SPj x ICi,j   (8) 
•  A station’s cost is;    CTi,j = pi,j x ICi,j   (9) 
 
For each station in the year 















•  Total Surplus is      STSi =  STRi  -  STCi (13) 
•  Total Operating Profit is    STPi =  STSi  -  Ci (14) 
 
For the market in the year 

























For each MWhr produced by each station 
 
•  Revenue per MWhr is     RPMi = STRi / STGi (20) 
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•  Cost per MWhr is      CPMi = STCi / STGi (21) 
 
•  Operation & Maintenance 
Cost per MWhr is       
OPMi = Ci / STGi (22) 
 
•  Operational Profit per MWhr is  PPMi = STPi / STGi (23) 
 
Each Station’s Utilisation is given by;   SUi = STGi / (365 x 24 x CPi) (24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 